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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
-v-
DANNY L. PIERCE, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 880346-CA 
Priority 2 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Danny L. Pierce, was charged with presenting 
a false or fraudulent insurance claim, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-521 (1978). 
He was convicted as charged by a jury in Fourth 
District Court, Judge Boyd L. Park, presiding, on February 24, 
1988. He was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for an 
indeterminate term of one to fifteen years. Execution of the 
sentence was suspended and defendant was placed on probation for 
18 months. The terms of probation included, inter alia, that he 
pay restitution in the amount of $6,450, that he pay a fine in 
the amount of $750 or complete 150 hours or community service, 
that he pay $187 to the victim's reparation fund, and that he 
serve 30 days in the Utah County Jail. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts are fully set forth in respondent's brief and 
are restated in this Court's opinion (see appendix). Respondent 
does not contend that this Court has overlooked or misapprehended 
an issue of fact. Therefore, the facts are not recapitulated 
here. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Respondent requests that this Court grant rehearing in 
this case in order to clarify its opinion with regard to the 
result and to state with more specificity what should occur on 
remand. There is some ambiguity with respect to whether 
defendant is entitled to a determination based upon the trial 
court's review of the record regarding whether the statute of 
limitations can be determined as a matter of law, or whether 
defendant is entitled to a new evidentiary hearing. Further, it 
is unclear whether defendant is entitled to a new trial 
regardless of the trial court's determination, or whether he is 
to be retried only if the trial court determines that the statute 
of limitations issue cannot be resolved as a matter of law. 
Further, this Court is respectfully requested to 
clarify its adoption of People v. Padfield, 185 Cal. Rptr. 903 
(Cal. App. 1982), as some aspects of Padfield are incompatible 
with Utah law. 
This Court is also urged to articulate a standard to be 
used in determining when a statute of limitations question is 
converted from a question of law to be determined only by the 
trial court to a question of fact to be determined by the jury, 
and to determine in this particular case whether suspicion on the 
part of law enforcement constitutes ''discovery" of the offense 
within the ambit of Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-303 (Supp. 1988). 
INTRODUCTION 
In Brown v. Pickard, 4 Utah 292, 294, 11 P. 512, 512 
(1886), the Utah Supreme Court set forth the standard for 
determining whether a petition for rehearing should be granted: 
To justify a rehearing, a strong case must be 
made. We must be convinced that the court 
failed to consider some material point in the 
case, or that it erred in its conclusions, or 
that some matter has been discovered which 
was unknown at the time of the hearing. 
(Citations omitted.) In Cummings v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 172-
73, 129 P. 619, 624 (1913), the Court stated: 
To make application for a rehearing is a 
matter of right, and we have no desire to 
discourage the practice of filing petitions 
for rehearings in proper cases. When this 
court, however, has considered and decided 
all of the material questions involved in a 
case, a rehearing should not be applied for, 
unless we have misconstrued or overlooked 
some material fact or facts, or have 
overlooked some statute or decision which may 
affect the result, or that we have based the 
decision on some wrong principle of law, or 
have either misapplied or overlooked 
something which materially affects the result 
. . . . If there are some reasons, however, 
such as we have indicated above, or other 
good reasons, a petition for rehearing should 
be promptly filed and, if it is meritorious, 
its form will in no case be scrutinized by 
this court. 
The argument portion of this brief will demonstrate that, based 
on these standards, the State's petition for rehearing is 
properly before the Court and should be granted. 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT IS REQUESTED TO CLARIFY ITS OPINION 
WITH RESPECT TO THE PROCEDURE TO BE FOLLOWED 
ON REMAND IN THIS CASE. 
The State respectfully submits that the opinion, State 
v. Pierce, No. 880346-CA, slip op. (Utah App., July 5, 1989), is 
ambiguous with regard to what should occur on remand in this 
case, and suggests that it would be helpful to clarify certain 
aspects of its opinion. Specifically, this Court stated, 
"Therefore, we reverse and remand so the issue of whether 
discovery of the unlawful act occurred within the period of the 
statute of limitations." Ijd. at 4. The meaning of the sentence 
is ambiguous in that it appears to be incomplete or to contain a 
typographical error. 
Further, it is unclear whether the trial court may 
determine, based upon a review of the record, whether as a matter 
of law that the prosecution was commenced within the statute of 
limitations, or whether defendant is entitled to a new 
evidentiary hearing because the trial court incorrectly imposed 
the burden of proof. It is also unclear whether defendant is 
entitled to a new trial even if the trial court can determine 
that, as a matter of law, the statute of limitations had not run. 
Most importantly, this Court is urged to clarify its 
adoption of People v. Padfield, 136 Cal. App. 3d 218, 185 Cal. 
Rptr. 903 (Cal. App. 1982). Respondent recognizes that although 
the issue would, on its face, appear to be rather straight-
forward, there is little caselaw to be used for guidance. And, 
although this is a matter of first impression in Utah, it appears 
that the better reasoned position, jn view of the fact that the 
statute of * .- ^ *Ily considered a question * ? , 
see, e.g., State v. Aguilar, 736 P. 2d t>;jG i ik , Apt- I 4fc i * . .i 
address the issue In a manner that would require the trial 
court, i., make the de l••• r m i na I i, n\ f o 1 1 ow i ncj n motion in 1 imine. 
The procedure to be followed could be similar to the procedure 
used when there is an allegation i -r illegal search and 
seizure. That procedure wc : ' ^ b- • -'* dant to 
appropriately ra:-* \* * i <?..*• i , presentation * some evidence 
i- *•- • >* hau Ian. un < * : - defendant had undertaken the 
burden i production of some * f* , 1 lit- prosecut m n
 W Ould then 
be required to prove, by whatever degree of proof (e.g., 
preponderance of the evidence, as the Padfield court held, or 
beyond a reasonable doubt), that the ^tat^te had not run. 
This Court is urged to adopt the position that even 
though t hf -ihii utr i ) lirtntat miis issue can involve mixed 
questions of fact and law, the issue ran and should be det ermi ned 
tne trie, court. First, whether the statute of limitations 
has r-un is - , : > - . * wnicn snould be resolved 
before the case proceeds : • • •.. Second there will a I .%*ayF be 
some question? ! *a •* about when .H+ enforcement discovered an 
act of fra\. < - «* « (Supp. 1988) and it 
would be difficu • : » • r . ^  ;>ur • determine when a fac :t A lal 
dispute converts the issue - - questic 
T f + **\± . : hat some statute 
of limitations questions should be resolved by the trier of fact, 
i! i, e urge-' I to adopt a standard for determining when a question 
of fact must be determined by the jury. For example, does mere 
suspicion, as was present in this case, constitute "discovery" 
for purposes of Utah Code Ann. S 76-1-303 (Supp. 1988). In 
Turner v. Liner, 87 P.2d 740, 742 (Cal. App. 1939), the court 
stated that "discovery and "knowledge" are not convertible terms 
and that whether there has been discovery of facts constituting 
fraud is a question of law to be determined by the trial court, 
but mere suspicion does not constitute discovery. 
If this Court maintains its adoption of Padfield, and 
thereby allows a jury to determine statute of limitations issues 
in some cases, the Court is urged to specifically limit its 
holding to include only the Padfield court's rationale in 
allowing a jury to determine the issue when there are mixed 
questions of law and fact. Otherwise, there is a risk of implied 
approval of other aspects of the opinion that are incompatible 
with Utah law (e.g., the prosecution must allege in an 
information facts to establish discovery of the crime). Also, 
the Court should clarify the burden of proof that must be met 
when a statute of limitations question is raised. The Pierce 
opinion could be construed as being internally inconsistent in 
that the Court adopted both Parnell v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. 
App. 3d 293, 173 Cal. Rptr. 906 (Cal. App. 1981), and Padfield. 
In Parnell, the court stated the people have the burden of 
establishing by "some evidence" that the prosecution was not 
barred by the statute of limitations, while the Padfield decision 
establishes that the prosecution prove by a "preponderance of the 
evidence" that the prosecution was not time barred. Because 
generally the "some evidence" standard implies that even slight 
or in i j) M'na I e "idenre ,1 s sufficient, which standard to be used is 
conf using. But more importantly, either standar< i ap peai s t o be 
.nit odds with Utah case law, which mandates an altogether 
ciifteirent burden of poo- - prosecution in similar 
circumstances. In Utah, whethei a defendant's claim oi in 'i 
guilty is based upon a denial or an affirmative defense, the 
prosecution must pt<»v* i f s rasr-, inrlylinq the lack of an 
affirmative defense, beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Knoll, 
712 P.2d 211 (Utah 1985); State v. Starks, 627 p.2d 88 (Utah 
1981). 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, it appears the Court may with 
to clarify its opinic * - . *- . •- ^apprehended 
certain issues and possible ramifications z: the decision. 
Therefor* he state's petition for rehearing should be granted 
and the Court's opinion revised. 
The state certifies that this petition Is presented in 
goc d fai t:h for t: J le reasons set out herein, and not ioi purposes 
of delay, 
19 RESPECTFULLY submitted this r[ '^day of July, 198( 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
I BARBARA BEARJISON 
' Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDUM 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOoo 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Danny L. Pierce, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
F ILED 
JUL 51989 
OPINIbN 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 880346-CA 
* 00 rmr 
fk of r» Court 
•ourt #f Appeals 
Fourth District, Utah County 
The Honorable Boyd L. Park 
Attorneys: R. Paul Van Dam, Barbara Bearnson, Salt Lake 
City# Respondent 
James P. Rupper, Provo, for Appellant 
Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Greenwood. 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Danny L. Pierce appeals his conviction of submitting a 
false or fraudulent insurance claim, a second degree felony in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-521 (1978). Pierce urges 
reversal of his conviction, claiming the fraud charge was 
barred by the statute of limitations. We reverse and remand. 
Sometime prior to July 14, 1981, Pierce contacted an 
insurance agent and told the agent he wanted insurance coverage 
in the amount of $8,000 on his truck. The agent issued an 
insurance binder on the truck on July 14, 1981. 
On July 19, 1981, Pierce contacted the agent and informed 
him that the truck had been stolen. Pierce met with Ned 
Walker, the claims adjuster assigned to handle the claim, and 
told him that Russell Hunsaker and Warren Booth had driven the 
truck to the University Mall in Orem, where they went to a 
movie, and that the truck was missing when they came out of the 
movie. Pierce received $8,000 from the insurance company for 
the loss, less $100 for the policy deductible amount* The 
actual loss to the insurance company after salvaging the truck 
was $6,450. 
During a deposition almost six years later on June 4, 
1987, in an unrelated civil matter, Russell Hunsaker informed 
Paul Johnson, the Orem City Attorney, that in July 1981 at 
Piercers request, he and Warren Booth took Pierce's truck up 
Provo Canyon, removed its tires and wheels and pushed it over a 
cliff. Warren Booth corroborated Hunsaker#s statements during 
his own deposition on August 5, 1987. 
On October 7, 1987, Pierce was charged with submitting a 
false or fraudulent insurance claim. Pierce filed a pretrial 
motion to dismiss, contending that the statute of limitations 
barred prosecution for the offense. The trial court stated 
that Pierce bore the burden of proving the statute had not been 
met. After a hearing, during which Pierce called witnesses to 
establish when the State discovered the fraud claim, the court 
denied the motion to dismiss. 
At trial, Pierce objected to the trial court's refusal to 
instruct the jury on the statute of limitations, arguing that 
the issue presented a question of fact to be appropriately 
decided by the jury. 
I. 
Pierce's first claim on appeal is that the information 
was defective because it failed to state why the statute of 
limitations did not bar prosecution of the offense. 
Ordinarily, a defendant obtains information necessary to 
satisfy the constitutional requirement of the right to adequate 
notice through an information and a bill of particulars. State 
v. Fulton. 742 P.2d 1208, 1214 (Utah 1987). *[A)n information 
may be an extremely summary statement of the charge, indeed one 
that would not provide the defendant with sufficient 
particulars to enable him to adequately prepare a defense." 
Id. When the notice provided by the information is 
constitutionally deficient, a defendant is entitled to a bill 
of particulars. Ifl.; State V. Robbing, 709 P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 
1985). Utah law allows amendment of an information before a 
verdict is issued, if no new or different offense is charged 
and the defendant is not thereby prejudiced. Utah Code Ann. 
S 77-35-4<d) (1982); State v. Wilson. 105 Utah Adv. Rep. 19, 24 
(Ct. App. 1989). However, if a defendant fails to raise the 
inadequacy of the information before trial by written motion, 
that issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. 
Eullfin, 742 P.2d at 1215; Utah R. Crim P. 12(b)(1). In this 
case, Pierce did not request a bill of particulars and also did 
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not file a written motion prior to trial challenging the 
adequacy of the information. Therefore, he waived the issue 
and cannot raise it for the first time on appeal. 
II. 
Pierce also claims the trial court erred in requiring him 
to prove that the information was not filed within the period 
specified in the applicable statutes of limitation, Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-1-302 and -303 (1988).* Because the trial court 
held that Pierce bore the burden of proving the statute of 
limitations had run, Pierce called witnesses to attempt to 
prove that police and the insurance company knew or should have 
known of the offense earlier than 1987, when Hunsaker and Booth 
were deposed. 
Generally, the State bears the burden of proving every 
element of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt, 
regardless of the types of defenses raised. State v. Starks, 
627 P.2d 88, 92 (Utah 1981). The Utah appellate courts have 
not previously declared whether the State's burden of proof 
extends to establishing that a criminal prosecution was 
commenced within the applicable statute of limitations. In 
State v. Taylor, 21 Or. App. 119, 533 P.2d 822, 823 (1975), 
however, the Oregon Court of Appeals stated that the 
prosecution must prove that an unlawful act occurred within the 
period of the statute of limitations. Similarly, in Parnell v. 
Superior Court, 119 Cal. App. 3d 392, 173 Cal. Rptr. 906, 914 
(1981), the court held that "[blecause the statute of 
limitations is jurisdictional, the People have the burden of 
supporting an information with some evidence that the 
prosecution is not barred by limitations.* We agree with the 
rationale of those cases, and, therefore, find that the State 
1. In this case, the alleged insurance fraud occurred in July 
1981 and the information was not filed until October 1987. Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-1-302 (1988) provides that a prosecution for a 
felony shall be commenced within four years after it is 
committed. In addition, Utah Code Ann. $ 76-1-303 (1988) 
provides! that if the period prescribed in section 76-1-303 has 
expired,!a prosecution may be commenced for an offense a 
material! element of which is fraud within one year after 
discovery of the offense. However, section 76-1-303 also states 
that in no case will the provision extend the period of 
limitation by more than three years. Thus, in this case, the 
statute of limitations on the prosecution*s action for fraud 
against Pierce would run seven years after the alleged offense 
was committed and was to be commenced within one year after 
discovery of the offense by an aggrieved party. 
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bears the burden of proving that a criminal action is not barred 
by the statute of limitations, whenever that issue is properly 
raised. 
In this case, Pierce raised the limitations issue in his 
motion to dismiss and the trial court erred in requiring him to 
go forward and prove that the action was not timely, rather than 
placing that burden on the State. Therefore, we reverse and 
remand so the issue of whether discovery of the unlawful act 
occurred within the period of the statute of limitations. 
III. 
Pierce also claims the jury should have been allowed to 
determine if the prosecution was barred by the statute of 
limitations, as the question presents an issue of fact. This 
question was discussed in People v. Padfield, 136 Cal. App. 3d 
218, 185 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1982). The court explained that a 
trial court has the discretion to consider evidence concerning 
running of a statute of limitations in pre-trial proceedings. 
id. at 908. If the evidence is sufficiently clear, the issue 
may be resolved as a matter of law at that juncture, avoiding, 
perhaps, further proceedings. If, however, "it cannot be said 
that as a matter of law the statutory period has run, the issue 
is a question of fact for the trier of fact." IdU We adopt that 
reasoning, and hold that on remand of this matter, the trial 
court should determine whether the evidence regarding when 
discovery of the crime occurred, or should have occurred, is 
sufficiently clear to rule as a matter of law, or, if room for 
dispute exists, submit the question to the jury. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Judith M. Billings, Jud 
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